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We devise a retrospective panel data approach to evaluate the effects of fair trade 
affiliation on the schooling decisions of a sample of Thai organic rice producers across 
the past 20 years. We find that the probability of school enrolment in families with 
more than two children is significantly affected by affiliation years. The finding is 
robust when dealing with endogeneity and heterogeneity issues in the estimate.  The 
non-positive preaffiliation performance documents that our result is not affected by 
selection  bias  and  that  fair  trade  affiliation  generates  a  significant  break  in  the 
schooling decisions of affiliated households.  
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1. Introduction 
 
It is common sense to expect a negative relationship between the number of children and children 
education for poor households in LDCs. The causal link between the two variables depends on the 
fact that families should decide jointly the number of children they want and the level of education 
to  give  them.  For  a  given  budget  constraint,  the  higher  the  number  of  children,  the  lower  the 
investment  in  available  per  child  education  (Becker  and  Tomes,  1976).  On  this  basis  a  causal 
relationship between number of children and probability of going to school may arise in case of an 
exogenous increase in family offspring.
1  
The goal of this paper is to verify whether in situations in which the quality (of education)/quantity 
trade-off is expected to matter (among agricultural producers in LDCs close to the poverty line),  
the trade-off may be eased by policies which affiliate producer cooperatives to organisations - such 
as those of fair trade (henceforth also FT) importers - which promote producers’ access to export 
markets and pay them a premium which has to be invested in both local public goods and capacity 
building.
2  
The direction of the impact of such policies on child schooling is not so straightforward. On the one 
side, the Basu and Van (1998) luxury axiom states that parents decide to send their children to 
school when they overcome a minimal household income threshold  which allows them to afford 
such cost. The income effect of such premium should have undoubtedly a positive impact on child 
schooling  if  it  brings  the  household  beyond  such  threshold.  On  the  other  side,  however,  the 
                                                 
1 Recent empirical contributions (Booth and Kee, 2009; Iacovou, 2001) show that education is 
negatively correlated with family size and birth order. The trade-off between quantity and quality is 
also  supported  by  findings  from  Hanushek  (2002),  Steelman  and  Powell  (1989),  and  Yilmazer 
(2008), the last two works showing that in large families there  are less financial resources  for 
school fees. On the other side Black et Al. (2005) find a relationship between birth order and school 
attainment where family effects are not significant, so that the determinants are differences within 
families and not only across families. For a more general survey on related issues in the child labour 
literature see among others Deb and Rosati (2002) and  Bhalotra and Heady (2003). 
2 A detailed description of the producer cooperative (GreenNet) and of the partner organisation 
promoting access to export markets (fair trade), object of our empirical analysis, will be provided in 
the next section.   3 
substitution  effect  of  the  price  premium  paid  by  the  fair  trade  organisation  tells  us  that  the 
opportunity cost of school investment is higher since one hour of child work in the household 
agricultural activity yields more. In addition to it, additional indirect changes in affiliated and non 
affiliated producer labour markets in a general equilibrium framework should also matter and be 
taken into account in the evaluation of the total impact.  
Our empirical analysis aims to evaluate the direction of such effect. Another main task of the paper 
is to disentangle, for what possible, causal links from two endogeneity problems which arise when 
dealing with the above mentioned issue. On the one side, the same quality/quantity trade-off may 
conceal  a  third  driving  factor  (i.e.  low  parents’  endowment  in  terms  of  ability,  wealth  and 
education) which affects both the decision to have more children and to invest less in them (Ponce-
Souza, 2009). On the other side, the relationship between affiliation to FT and child schooling may 
also be spurious and driven by selection bias. 
A  final  added  value  in  our  paper  is  methodological  and  lies  in  the  definition  of  a  simple  and 
effective retrospective panel data approach. The latter helps to investigate issues in which repeated 
observations on the same sample of individuals for many years are too costly or, if not started in 
advance,  make  just  impossible  an  impact  analysis.  With  this  respect  we  devise  a  very  simple 
approach which allows to build retrospectively panel data without requiring unreasonable memory 
efforts by repondents. Differently from McIntosh et al. (2010) who look at house restructuring 
events, we build our retrospective panel data on simple questions about children age and schooling 
years allowing us to reconstruct the pattern of household schooling decisions over a long time 
interval.  
 
The  paper  aims  to  deal  with  all  these  issues  and  is  divided  into  eight  sections  (including 
introduction and conclusions). In the second section we briefly explain FT characteristics and the 
literature  debate  around  them.  In  the  third  section  we  provide  a  short  story  of  the  cooperative 
investigated.  In  the  fourth  section  we  describe  the  survey  design  and  the  memorable  event   4 
methodology with which we transform cross-sectional data into panel. In the fifth and sixth sections 
we present and discuss our descriptive and econometric findings. In the seventh section we focus on 
the endogeneity problem and discuss how we dealt with it. 
 
2. What is FT  
 
Ropi is a village situated in the Southern part of Ethiopia, at 320 km from the capital and 70 km 
from Shashemane town. Ropi farmers produce wheat in the wet season which they individually sell 
below the seasonal (low) market price to the unique organisation of local intermediaries which 
brings the product to Shashemane. In the dry season Ropi farmers run out of wheat and have to buy 
it from the same traders at the seasonal market prices which usually double with respect to those of 
the wet season.  
This story of imbalance in market power between primary producers and local intermediaries is 
strikingly similar to that of Kenyan farmers in Meru Central and Tharaka, approximately 200 km 
from  Nairobi,  on  Mount  Kenya’s  eastern  slopes  (Becchetti-Costantino,  2008),    of  handicraft 
producers  in  the  District  of  Juliaca    (Department  of  Puno)  located  around  the  Titicaca  lake 
(Becchetti et al., 2007) and  of the  Thai farmers which will be analysed in this paper. 
In many situations like these, extreme poverty depends, among other factors, on insufficient market 
access, lack of bargaining power with intermediaries, low productivity and insufficient capacity to 
manage inventories at village level.  
The  goal  of  fair  trade  is  to  address  such  situations.  According  to  IFAT,  the  main  umbrella  
gathering  most  of  fair  trade  producers  and  importers,  “Fair  Trade  is  a  strategy  for  poverty 
alleviation and sustainable development. Its purpose is to create opportunities for producers who 
have  been  economically  disadvantaged  or  marginalized  by  the  conventional  trading  system”. 
Beyond  official  declarations  fair  trade  may  therefore  be  conceived  as  an  economic  initiative 
promoted by organizations of importers, distributors and retailers from Europe and the US which   5 
aim to promote capacity building, market inclusion and improvement of marginalized producers’ 
wellbeing.  The  first  and  basic  FT  impact  is  its  “antitrust”  effect  achieved  with  the  simple 
diversification of sale channels offered to producers. Fair trade criteria
3 potentially include: i) an 
anticyclical mark-up on producers’ prices incorporating an insurance mechanism against excess 
price  downfalls;
4  ii)  anticipated  financing  schemes  reducing  the  likelihood  credit  rationing;  iii) 
export services and access to foreign markets; iv) direct investment in local public goods (health 
and education) through the contribution provided to the local producers’ associations. 
Given these characteristics, FT has the potential to address market failures such as credit rationing, 
underinvestment in local public goods (health, education and professional training), monopsony of 
local intermediaries and/or moneylenders (Becchetti and Rosati, 2007).
5 On the consumer side, it 
has  also  been  demonstrated  that  it  may  satisfy  consumers’  willingness  to  pay  for  social  and 
environmental intangibles incorporated into the final product, generating contagion effects on profit 
maximising competitors (Becchetti and Solferino, 2008).
6 
                                                 
3  According  to  the  IFAT  charter  such  criteria  are:  i)  Creating  opportunities  for  economically 
disadvantaged  producers;  ii)  Transparency  and  accountability;  iii)  Capacity  building;  iv) 
Promoting Fair Trade; v) Payment of a fair price; vi) Gender Equity; vii) Working conditions 
(healthy  working  environment  for  producers.  The  participation  of  children,  if  any,  does  not 
adversely  affect  their  well-being,  security,  educational  requirements  and  need  for  play  and 
conforms to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child as well as the law and norms in the local 
context); viii) The environment; ix) Trade Relations (Fair Trade Organizations trade with concern 
for the social, economic and environmental well-being of marginalized small producers and do not 
maximise profit at their expense. They maintain long-term relationships based on solidarity, trust 
and mutual respect that contribute to the promotion and growth of Fair Trade. Whenever possible, 
producers are assisted with access to pre-harvest or pre-production advance payment). 
4  An  example  of  Fair  Trade  price  premium  is  in  the  banana  market.  In  Ecuador,  the  2005 
conventional market price for 1.14 kilos of bananas was 2.91 US $, against a FT price of 7.75 US $. 
Evidence of FT premium on prices of coffee beans and cocoa in the last 20 years is also well known 
and available from the authors upon request. 
5  For  a  theoretical  evaluation  of  the  effects  of  FT  from  the  perspective  of  trade  theories  see 
Maseland and De Vaal (2002). Other relevant papers dealing with various aspects of the impact of 
FT are those of Moore (2004), Hayes (2004) and Redfern and Snedker (2002). 
6 Nestlè introduced in October 2005 a fair trade product in its product range, Coop UK launched its 
own fair trade product line, while Starbucks has rapidly become the main seller of FT coffee in the 
last  few  years.  Recent  partial  (or  planned)  adoption  of  FT  practices  also  comes  from  Tesco, 
Sainsbury  and  was  announced  by  Mars.  For  a  discussion  on  competition  between  fair  trade 
dedicated retailers and supermarkets see also Kohler (2007). A chronology of  the partial imitation   6 
The economic debate around FT is lively and concentrated around three main critiques.  
The first typical objection is that the producer mark-up is a non market clearing price which may 
create excess supply, leading to  distortion in producer specialisation. The second wonders why 
buying  fair-trade  products  should  be  better  than  a  standard  purchase  plus  charity  donation 
mechanism scheme (for an amount equivalent to the price differential between the fair trade and the 
traditional  product)  (LeClair,  2002).  The  final  one  argues  that  FT  may  adversely  affect  the 
wellbeing of non affiliated local producers (LeClair, 2002). 
On the first issue it should be considered that specialisations are dynamic and change according to 
human capital accumulation. In this respect, there is nothing different between fair trade and a 
project aiming to improve productivity of a non competitive group of French, Italian or Australian 
wine producers by developing new lines of product and improving their market access. In addition 
to it, and from a static point of view, the ancticyclical price premium may be consistent with market 
equilibrium in situations in which local intermediaries have monopsony power on marginalised 
producers.
7 Beyond this case, it has been observed that the FT product is a new variety with respect 
to the non FT equivalent due to its additional intangible characteristics appreciated by consumers. If 
this is true fair trade may be conceived as a sort of general purpose innovation which increases 
product variety. Finally, some authors emphasize that the premium works as an optimal incentive 
device which solves a moral hazard problem of the local producer’s  investment (Reinstein and 
Song, 2008). 
The second point requires a comparison of the effects of the FT premium paid on the product with 
respect to standard aid programs. What can be noted is that the latter, differently from the “portfolio 
                                                                                                                                                                  
steps  of  large  transnationals  toward  fair  trade  is  available  on 
http://www.fairtrade.org.uk/what_is_fairtrade/history.aspx. 
7 This has been verified for Meru Herbs by Becchetti and Costantino (2008) who find that fair trade 
reduced dependence of affiliated farmers from Nairobi intermediaries and by Becchetti et al. (2008) 
in a study on affiliated Peruvian wool producers in the Juliaca region (Titicaca lake) where the 
introduction of fair trade determined an increase in their bargaining power (and an improvement in 
price conditions) with local intermediaries. 
   7 
vote” of FT consumers,
8 have no local antitrust effects and do not create contagion among fair trade 
profit maximising competitors. The third critique cannot be solved from a theoretical point of view 
(results are too dependent on side conditions) and needs to be tackled empirically case by case.  
What the above mentioned debate indicates is that impact studies on FT are of extreme interest and 
they are so for at least three reasons. 
In the first place the phenomenon is  growing  more rapidly than the capacity of  economists of 
analysing it. Between 2006 and 2007, total FT sales registered a 127% increase by volume and 72% 
by estimated retail value. Growth in Europe has averaged 50 % per year in the last 6 years and FT 
gained significant shares in some market segments (47 percent of bananas in Switzerland and 20 
percent of UK bananas after the decision of some of the main UK distributors to import only these 
products.  Due  to  this  increasing  market  success,  on  September  the  3
rd  2008,  Ebay  launched  a 
dedicated  platform  (WorldOfGood.com)  for  fair  trade  e-commerce.  It  calculates  that  the  U.S. 
market for such goods was $209 billion in 2005, and forecasts that it will rise up to $420 billion in 
2010.  
A second reason for the relevance of empirical investigations on this phenomenon is that the doubt 
of what is really behind the product they buy remains in the minds of all FT consumers. In essence, 
the social and environmentally friendly characteristics of the products are not an experience good 
(that  is,  the  information  gap  on  their  SR  characteristics  cannot  be  bridged  by  repeated 
                                                 
8  We  should  conceive  FT  as  the  most  fashionable  example  of  a  more  general  phenomenon  of 
consumers’ revealed social preferences and producers’ capacity of extracting surplus from them. 
Other recent interesting examples are the dedicated shops in Sicily selling products of entrepreneurs 
who decided not to pay fees to local mafia (“addiopizzo shops”) and all the initiatives with which 
corporations are able to extract the “social surplus” from socially responsible consumers. To quote 
just few of them, Cathay Pacific adopted a dual pricing policy offering to “concerned” consumers a 
more expensive air ticket where the price differential with respect to the standard one finances 
reforestation policies of the air company. Finally Rabobank, Credit Agricole and other cooperative 
banks  offer  to  address  part  of  the  accrued  interest  on  bank  accounts  to  social  as  well  as 
environmental destinations (the additional cost may be paid only by clients or by clients and the 
bank). 
 
   8 
consumption).  Hence,  rigorous  empirical  work  is  required  to  bridge  informational  asymmetries 
between buyers and sellers and to evaluate whether FT promises are met or not.  
A third argument is that results of FT impact analyses may be very useful to evaluate critically and 
eventually redress FT criteria. 
At the moment, the FT impact study literature mainly consists of some well structured case studies 
(Bacon, 2005; Pariente, 2000; Castro, 2001; Nelson and Galvez, 2000; Ronchi, 2002; Yanchus and 
de Vanssay, 2003) and a few econometric impact analyses. Among the latter Ronchi (2006) finds 
on a panel based on 157 mill data that FT helped affiliated Costa Rican coffee producers to increase 
their market power. The author concludes that FT benefits are of a vertical integration type and that 
“the decision to support fair trade requires other information about its costs and benefits”. In an 
econometric study on the impact of FT on Kenyan farmers, Becchetti and Costantino (2008) show 
that capacity bulding, trade and product risk diversification (an element not included in official 
criteria),  by  reducing  their  vulnerability  to  shocks,  are  the  main  sources  of  benefit  for  local 
affiliated producers. An empirical analysis on Peruvian producers (Becchetti et al., 2007) finds that 
affiliation  has  significant  effects  on  professional  self  esteem  and  life  satisfaction  (also  not 
considered among FT criteria).
9  
Within this literature the specific goal of our study is to analyse the effects of FT affiliation on child 
schooling by creating economic opportunities for poor producers.  
In this respect a very important point is that fair trade does not explicitly ban child labour and 
therefore its impact on it may only be indirect. This is clearly documented by criterion vii) on 
Working conditions (see footnote 3) which states that “The participation of children, if any, does 
not adversely affect their well-being, security, educational requirements and need for play and 
conforms to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child as well as the law and norms in the local 
context”. However, FT should act indirectly on child schooling by creating conditions for capacity 
building and higher producer’s productivity and household income. In addition to it, as mentioned 
                                                 
9 For  a survey of these and other impact analyses on FT see Ruben (2008).   9 
before, FT may help in addressing market failures such as credit rationing by providing members 
with  various  advantages  such  as  interest-free  credit  support,  anticipated  financial  schemes,  an 
anticyclical mark-up on producers’ prices which incorporates an insurance mechanism, and product 
risk diversification which lowers the producers’ vulnerability to shocks (Becchetti and Costantino, 
2008). With this respect we may remember that the theoretical and empirical child labour literature 
emphasizes  the  importance  of  access  to  the  credit  market  and  the  containment  of  shocks  in 
determining the household decisions concerning children’s time allocation.
10 The imperfections of 
both  formal  and  informal  credit  and  insurance  markets,  represent,  particularly  in  developing 
countries, a very relevant cause of suboptimal allocation of household resources to human capital 
investment. 
 
3. The FT Project in Thailand 
 
GreenNet
11 is the main fair trade producer and exporter of organic rice in Thailand. It was founded 
in  1993  in  form  of  cooperative  mainly  focused  on  environmental  sustainability  and  social 
responsible  business  and  received  the  fair  trade  certification  by  the  Fair  Trade  Labeling 
Organization in 2002. 
                                                 
10 See, among others, Ranjan (2001), Cigno, Rosati, and Tzannatos (2002), Guarcello, Mealli and 
Rosati (2002).  
11  According to its statute, GreenNet's mission is “to serve as a marketing channel for small-
scale organic farmers with fair trade principles in its marketing activities”, and, in particular, to: i) 
promote organic way of life through marketing and producing high quality organic and natural 
products  (organic  fairtrade  rice;  organic  vegetables  and  baby  corn  organic  coconut  silk  and 
cotton); ii) conduct trade with fair price for producers and buyers; iii) have responsibility for 
consumers and environment; iv) Support producers to organize as community enterprise to produce 
high quality organic and natural products and safe for consumers and environment; v) transfer 
knowledge  organization’s  research  and  development  to  general  public;  vi)  campaign  for 
environment and fair trade; vii) support employees’ creativity and make them feel as an important 
part of organization; commit to generate organization growth with stability and continuity; viii) 
create  added  value  for  share-holders  and  appropriate  returns;  ix)  be  a  model  organization  of 
“Social business” and  encourage other business bodies to be more concerned with consumers 
safety, environment conservation and social responsibility.   10 
Farmers affiliated to GreenNet produce organic long grain red, white and brown Jasmine rice
12 and 
the  production  chain  is  organized  in  the  following  way.  A  producers’  group,  namely  a  local 
cooperative composed by 5-9 representative farmers, buys the paddy rice produced and sold by 
farmers; price and grading are decided by the Organic Fair Trade Rice Committee composed of 2 
members  per  producers’  groups,  2  members  of  GreenNet  Coop  and  2  members  of  Earth  Net 
Foundation
13.  
GreenNet provides advance payment for producer groups stocking the paddy. It receives export 
orders  for  the  year  and  instructs  accordingly  producer  groups  on  the  quantity  to  be  delivered. 
Producer groups then deliver  the milled rice to GreenNet which they  export and/or sell it locally 
once packaged.  
Organic farmers receive two relevant benefits from GreenNet: i) a fair trade premium to be used for 
social  and  capacity  building  activities  for  organic  farmers  (i.e.,  scholarships,  emergency  funds, 
credit facilities, training, etc.) in accordance with the FLO laws; ii) an extra yearly fair trade bonus.
  
To clarify this mechanism, price formation in 2008 is described in Table 1. The Table also clarifies 
the  size  of  FT  bonus  and  FT  premium  as  well  as  their  utilization  for  the  two  areas  under 
examination.  
                                                 
12  Farmers' organic production is organised as follows. Cropping pattern begins in May after 
the first rainfall. Farmers plough the land to remove the weed. Weed residues are incorporated into 
the soil and the fields are left for the residues to be decomposed. After the decomposition, a second 
ploughing is done in order to loosen the topsoil and to flatten the field in order to regulate the water 
level. Rice seedlings are transplanted into the field around June-August. Rice takes around 3-4 
months to mature. The grain is left to dry in the field before harvesting (ranging from  end of 
November to December). Few farming activities occur after this period since water is not abundant 
during dry season. In areas where irrigation exists, farmers may plant legume crops (e.g. peanut or 
sward been) or cash crops (e.g. melon) in the rice fields. Also, some may cultivate vegetable crops 
during the winter season (around December-January) as there are few pests on vegetables during 
this period. Rice is cultivated once a year and thus little pest infestation problems occur.  
13  The price can vary according to the quality of paddy rice but, on average, it is around 12,000 
thousand Bath per ton of organic Jasmine rice.    11 
GreenNet  is  a  second  level  cooperative.  The  second  level  is  generally  necessary  to  coordinate 
production among local cooperatives, implement research and promote organic farming as well as 
provide export services on a wider scale. All members of first level associations are also members 
of GreenNet. GreenNet affiliation has been evaluated by surveying affiliated and non affiliated 
farmers  from  two  different  first-level  organizations  in  the  Yasothorn  province:  the  Bak  Reua 
Farmer Organization (BRFO) and the Nature Care Society (NCS).  
 
3.1 The Bak Reua Farmer Organization (BRFO) 
Registered as “Farmer Organization” under the Ministry of Agriculture since 8 April 1976, the 
BRFO aims to: i) support members to grow rice without using chemical inputs and establish rice 
farmlands appropriate to local ecology; ii) strengthen farmer organization so that it can manage and 
control rice quality throughout the chain; iii) encourage learning among farmers so that they can 
manage rice mill as rural enterprises sustainably. It is situated in Ban Don Phueng village (Moo 4) 
of Tambol Bak Reua, Mahachanachai District, Yasothorn province, is 35 Km from Yasothorn and 
roughly 530 kilometres from Bangkok. Its membership is spread across 45 villages of 25 tambol 
(all in Yasothorn province). 
BRFO was created in 1976 by the government agency to facilitate government's chemical fertilizer 
distribution plan. After that, it temporary suspended its activities because of the failure in collecting 
member's  payments.  It  was  re-established  again  in  1981,  continuing  the  implementation  of  the 
above-mentioned  fertilizer  distribution  scheme.    Only  in  1987  it  started  collective  buying  and 
selling of rice paddy. A small rice mill was built in 1989 for farmers' self consumption and in 1994 
BRFO received funding from the government to construct a commercial mill. A local NGO started 
working there in 1996 aiming to reduce agro-chemicals use in rice farming. In 1999, the groups 
started collaborating with GreenNet. 
The BRFO was established with 118 members in 1976 and reached 853 members in 2007. An 
entrance fee of 20 TBT and the purchase a minimum of 1 shares (price = 10 TBT/share) of BRFO   12 
are required to become a member. Moreover, members can buy a 100 thousand bath (henceforth 
THB) share of the rice mill.  
BRFO started pesticide-free rice farming in 1996 in accordance with the following certification 
standards: i) ACT Organic Standards according to IFOAM Basic Standards (IFOAM programme); 
ii) EU Regulation 2092/91; iii) BioSwiss organic standards. 
In addition, starting from 2002, BRFO is receiving the FLO’s certification  as being part of the 
GreenNet Cooperative. The fair trade premium is divided into several funds which farmer members 
can apply to support: i) green manure seed; ii) farmer training; iii) member welfare, e.g. education 
of their children, natural disaster relief. 
 
3.2 The Nature Care Society (NCS) 
Objectives and goals of the Nature Care Society (NCS) are: i) to support members to grow rice 
without using chemical inputs; ii) to solve farmers’ problems of unfair price and trading in paddy; 
iii) to expand the milling capacity in order to exploit economies of scale; iv) to strengthen farmer 
organizations; v) to provide learning process in running a community business. NCS is situated in 
Ban Sok Kumpoon village (Moo 2) of Tambol Naso, Kudchum District, Yasothorn province, is 40 
Km far from Yasothorn and about 530 kilometres from Bangkok. Its membership is spread across 
95 villages of 5 districts (all in Yasothorn province). 
Since 1980, habitants of Naso village began working with the Herbal for Self-Reliance Project- 
HSRP (a local NGO aiming to promote herbal medicines and traditional health care systems). In 
1991 local farmers built up a rice mill to process the natural rice with the support of the HSRP.    
The Nature Care Society mill is associated with “Naso Rice Farmer Organization”, a registered 
organization under the Ministry of Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperative (Farmer Organization 
has a legal status equivalent to Farmer Cooperative)  
NCS began autonomously the organic rice farming in 1992, while in 1996 a group of farmers first 
received organic certification. The standards followed by such a certification were: i) ACT Organic   13 
Standards according to IFOAM Basic Standards (IFOAM programme); ii) EU Regulation 2092/91; 
iii) BioSwiss organic standards. 
As a partner of GreenNet Cooperative, NCS is receiving the FLO’s certification since  2002. The 
fair  trade  premium  is  allocated  in  the  following  way:  i)  50%    to  the  mill  for  improving  its 
management;  ii)  25%  to  the  extension  works;  iii)  25%  to  the  Organic  Fair-Trade  Fund  which 
provides  credits  to  members  willing  to  convert  into  sustainable  production  as  well  as  other 
community benefits. 
 
4. The dataset and the restrospective panel approach 
 
On August 2008, 2,360 farmers were surveyed in the Kud Chun and Bak Reua districts (see Table 
2).  
For each district, an equal number of respondents was randomly chosen between affiliated and non 
affiliated farmers in order to create a treatment (members of GreenNet) and a control group (non-
members of GreenNet). For the first group, a random selection from the list of all members in the 
two areas has been drawn, whereas, for the latter, a random sample of farmers living close (within 
10 km) to organic farmers has been generated. Descriptive statistics will highlight that treatment 
and control samples are not significantly different in terms of socio-demographic features
14  
Interestingly, cooperative membership is more common than fair trade affiliation since 84% and 
77% of farmers  from Kud Chun and Bak Reua respectively, are cooperative members. In other 
terms, while all affiliated farmers are by definition cooperative members, 60% of non FT-affiliated 
members belong to cooperatives as well. By taking into account this feature, and by separately 
controlling  for  both  cooperative  and  FT  membership,  it  will  be  possible  to  isolate  in  the 
                                                 
14  Beyond attention to the sample design, we will address selection bias  by comparing 
preformation and postformation trends and by estimating our model on the  restricted sample of 
affiliated producers only after taking into account problems of heterogeneity between young and 
old affiliated (see section 5).   14 
econometric  analysis  the  specific  effect  of  FT  and/or  organic  certification  from  a  generic 
cooperative effect.  
As  to  the  kind  of  data  collected,  the  questionnaire  contains  75  questions  aimed  at  measuring 
qualitative  and  quantitative  well-being.  More  specifically,  in  addition  to  the  classical  socio-
economic  variables,  it  collects  information  on  income  and  wealth  according  to  their  various 
measures  (i.e  land  size,  housing,  sanitation  and  durables,  etc.),  savings  and  productivity,  child 
schooling  and  farmer  education,  working  activity  and  working  conditions,  price  and  trading 
information, human and social capital indicators, self-esteem and happiness.
15  
As  already  mentioned  in  the  introduction  we  reconstruct  with  the  restrospective  approach  the 
pattern of household schooling decisions over time with very simple questions. Respondents are 
asked about their family size, the age of their offspring, the schooling years of each member and the 
age at which they started school (usually 5 or 6). A final question is whether and when school was 
suspended and restarted by some of the respondent children. Overall, we argue that this information 
is highly memorable if we consider that (beyond age) parents must be informed and aware of this 
basic information about children education. 
Table  3  provides  summary  statistics  of  the  main  variables  and  Table  4  summarizes  basic 
information on the two samples.   
 
 
5. Descriptive findings 
 
In a previous paper Becchetti, Conzo and Gianfreda (2008) document that, in the same sample on 
which we perform our analysis, fair trade affiliated have a significantly higher per capita income 
than the control sample. From a descriptive point of view household income from agriculture is on 
average 60,942 TBT for affiliated against 41,646 for non affiliated producers (the average number 
                                                 
15 Variable legend is in Appendix 1 and the full questionnaire is omitted for reasons of space and 
available upon request.   15 
of household members being around 3.8 for both subsamples) (see Table 3) and the difference is 
significant at 95 percent in both parametric and nonparametric tests. It remains significant as well 
when  we  consider  the  same  variable  adjusted  for  the  market  value  of  self  consumption 
(significantly larger for affiliated producers) and total income (including other productive activity). 
From an econometric point of view Becchetti et al. (2008) show that  any additional affiliation year 
raises per capita income from agriculture by a number within the 600-1,200 TBT range. The result 
remains significant after various robustness checks (propensity score matching, IV estimates with 
instruments  which  satisfy  exclusion  restrictions,  estimates  on  the  treatment  sample  only). 
Unfortunately we cannot directly use this evidence on productivity gains of affiliated versus non 
affiliated farmers since we do not have time series but only evidence related to the year of the 
survey. However, this observed income effect is at the basis of  our analysis in which we want to 
check  whether  the  creation  of  higher  economic  value  leads  farmers  to  modify  their  schooling 
decisions.  
In Figures 1a and 1b we document the relationship between the likelihood of school enrolment and 
birth order for affiliated and non affiliated farmers. A first clear cut evidence shows that, on the 
overall, the probability of going to school is positively correlated with birth order. Such probability 
starts from 84 percent for the first child and falls up to 71 percent for the fifth child and 53 percent 
for  the  sixth  child.  From  a  descriptive  point  of  view  fair  trade  affiliation  seems  to  matter  for 
children of lower birth order. The probability of going to school for the fourth child is 80 against 65 
percent in affiliated and non affiliated farmer households respectively. The same numbers are 64 
and 32 percent when we consider the sixth child.  
Findings are similar when we look at the probability of going to school (irrespective of the age 
order) in smaller and larger families. Such probability is roughly the same for affliated and non 
affiliated single child families while a gap progressively widens as far as the number of children 
grows and is largest (70 against 32 percent) in families with six children. 
   16 
6. Econometric findings 
 
In the econometric section we want to check whether our descriptive findings are significant and 
robust when controlling for concurring determinants of child schooling.  
Based on descriptive evidence showing that affiliation makes a difference when households have 
more children, we use the number of affiliation years for families with more than two children as 
regressor  measuring  the  affiliation  effect.  We  then  estimate  the  model  in  the  overall  sample 
(controlling or not for the baseline affiliation year variable) and in the subsample which includes 
only families with more than two children.  
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where Schoolijt is a dummy taking value of one if the i-th children of the j-th family went to school 
in  the  year  t  and  zero  otherwise,  Nchildjt  is  the  number  of  children  in  the  family  j  at  time  t, 
TrendfutureFT is a (pre affiliation) trend variable measuring the number of years in the sample of 
the child family before entering into FT,
16 FTYearlargefam, is the number of FT affiliation years 
for families with more than two children, FTyear is the number of affiliation years and DYear are 
time dummies (1989 is the omitted benchmark year).  
We estimate the selected specification with fixed family effects (ηj). The family effect approach has 
the  disadvantage  of  hiding  the  contribution  of  family  time  invariant  factors  (such  as  parent 
education) grouping them generically in fixed household characteristics. We will however identify 
the direction of such effects in the GMM estimate robustness check illustrated in the section which 
follows. 
                                                 
16 Since all GreenNet farmers are affiliate to Fair Trade after 2001 such variable coincides with the 
GreenNet affiliation effect before the agreement with fair trade. When evaluated together with FT 
affiliation years it measures the impact of cooperative membership and organic production, net of 
the enjoyment of market acces and premium benefits from FT.   17 
In the first estimate on the overall sample (Table 4, column 1) affiliation years significantly affect 
the probability of going to school in households with more than two children. An important element 
of this finding is that not just the treatment per se, but also the graduation of the treatment (exposure 
to affiliation) have significant effects on our dependent variable. Controlling for year effects is 
important  here  since  the  latter  are  obviously  correlated  with  affiliation  years.  Our  result  is 
confirmed  when  we  add  to  the  specification  the  baseline  affiliation  year  effect  which  is  not 
significant (Table 4, column 2) and also when we restrict the sample to households with more than 
two children (Table 4, column 3).  
In order to eliminate potential heterogeneity between treatment and control sample we reestimate 
all our specifications in the subsample containing FT affiliated producers only (Table 4, columns 4-
6).  The  significance  of  our  main  variables  of  interest  persists.  Consider  that,  when  using  this 
approach we do not have serious problems of heterogeneity between young and old affiliated since 
the maximum number of affiliation years is relatively small (six) and we have no survivorship bias 
problems in this relatively short period. 
Among other variables it worth noting that the pre-affiliation trend (TrendfutureFT) is negative 
(and strongly significant in three of the six estimates). This is an important indirect check of the 
validity of the assumption of homogeneity between treatment and control samples. In presence of 
selection bias and ex ante superior skills of the affiliated producers we should observe a continuity 
between  pre-affiliation  and  post-affiliation  trend  effects    on  our  performance  variable  (the 
probability  of  sending  children  to  school).  This  is  not  the  case  and,  indeed,  the  negative  and 
sometimes significant effect of affiliation trend indicates a break and not a continuity around the 
affiliation year.  
As a robustness check we alternatively estimate the model with a panel probit estimate with random 
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where υj is a normally distributed random family effect. Before estimating the random effect model 
we check with the Hausman test whether the problem of non orthogonality between regressors and 
the dependent variable significantly changes estimated coefficient and prevent us from using this 
approach. We find that the null of no significant difference in coefficients estimated with fixed 
effects (1) and random effects (2) is rejected in the first two estimates on the overall sample, never 
rejected  when  the  sample  is  limited  to  families  with  more  than  two  children  and  around  the 
rejection threshold in the first two estimates with the treatment sample only (columns 4 and 5). 
What drives the result of the Hausman test is the strong difference in the number of child variable 
coefficients across the two (random and fixed effect) specifications. If we remove that variable the 
null is never rejected in all of the six estimates. 
Consider also that the Mundlak (1978) correction with the introduction of individual averages of 
relevant  regressors  across  the  sample  period,  which  could  take  partially  into  account  of  fixed 
effects,  is  not  feasible  due  to  serious  multicollinearity  problems  (a  VIF  far  above  10).
17The 
difference between (2) and (1) is therefore the replacement of the fixed with the random effect  jt u , 
with  the  second  approach  giving  us  the  possibility  of  measuring  the  impact  of  specific  time 
invariant regressors such as Area (a dummy taking value of one if the producer is located in Kud 
Chun and zero otherwise), Controlcoop (a dummy for control producers which takes value of one if 
they belong to a cooperative) and Birthyear (the producer’s year of birth).  
The reported coefficients measure the change in the probability for an infinitesimal change in each 
independent, continuous variable and the discrete change in the probability for dummy variables. 
The significance of affiliation years for families with more than two children is confirmed positive 
and significant both in the overall and in the FT affiliated only estimates. Under the (probit specific) 
restrictive assumption of normally distributed link function, the magnitude of the effect indicates 
                                                 
17 The VIF (variance inflation factor) formula is 1/1-R(x) where R(x) is the R squared when the 
independent variable is regressed on all other independent variables (Marquardt, 1970). If R(x) is 
low (tends to zero) the VIF test is low (equal to one). A VIF value below 10 (or, more restrictively, 
five) is considered acceptable by rules of thumb standardly adopted  in the literature.   19 
that, when affiliation years double with respect to sample mean, the probability of sending children 
to school raises in a range between 25 and 32 percent according to different estimates. Note as well 
the strong significance of the year of birth showing that younger producers are more likely to send 
their children to school. Preformation trends are confirmed as negative also in this estimate. 
 
7. The endogeneity problem 
 
The estimates commented above suffer from  two potential endogeneity problems. The first is the 
selection bias in affiliation. Unobservable factors related with producer’s innate ability and activism 
can cause both affiliation and the inherited pre-schooling children talents. Together with this we 
have the traditional endogeneity problem related to the quantity-quality trade-off in the schooling 
literature.  Note  that,  in  principle,  we  are  interested  only  to  the  differential  effect  generated  by 
affiliation on quality for a given level of quantity. Hence, if we assume that the two endogeneity 
problems are independent from each other, we can focus on the first one (selection bias). Since this 
assumption may be restrictive, we however adopt a set of strategies which include ways to deal 
with both biases at a time.   
More specifically, to address the first problem (which we admit cannot be fully solved) we devise 
the  following  three  checks.  First,  we  estimate  the  model  in  the  treatment  group  only,  thereby 
avoiding distortions related to any sort of heterogeneity between treatment and control individuals 
(Table 5, columns 4-6).
18 Second, we look at preaffiliation trends of affiliated farmers (see the 
effect of such variable in Tables 5 and 6). A positive preaffiliation trend would create the suspicion 
that our result is driven by the selection bias since the positive performance in schooling decision 
by affiliated is already in action before affiliation. We however find negative or insignificant effects 
                                                 
18  Consider  that,  for  a  spurious  result  between  affiliation  years  and  child  education  driven  by 
heterogeneity between young and old affiliated, we should have that old affiliated are more likely to 
send their children to school. We however control for this and find that the problem does not apply 
here  since  there  is  no  significant  difference  between  preformation  trends  of  young  and  old 
affiliated.   20 
of preaffiliation trends combined with positive and significant effects of affiliation  years. Such 
evidence is in striking contrast with the selection bias. 
Third, we device in this section a way to tackle both endogeneity problems together. We build a 
human capital investment index at household level and estimate (at household level) a one step 
GMM dynamic panel specification where both the number of children in the school age cohort and 
the number of affiliation years are instrumented by predetermined and exogenous variables.  
The dependent variable of the household level estimate is a time varying index of human capital 
investment for each producer, build on retrospective data and represented by the number of children 
attending school over the total number of children in the schooling age cohort in a given year. More 
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where the HSIit index is the number of the j children of the i-th producer in a chosen school age 
cohort (e.g. age range between 6
19 and 18, if we are interested in elementary, middle and high 
school, and between 13 and 18 if we are only interested in high school, etc.) who actually went to 
school in a given year t (TOTSCHijt), divided by the number of children of the i-th producer being 
in the related school age cohort in the same period (TOTPOTijt).
20 In other words, the HSIit index is 
a ratio of effective to potential household human capital investment. We estimate the model with 
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19 Entry age is generally 5 or 6 and is based on the respondent declaration. 
20 The total number of children for each farmer (ni) is indexed to account for heterogeneity in 
household size.   21 
where  t i l m HSI , ) , ( t t  is the schooling investment index for the  ) , ( l m t t  school age cohort (i.e. from 
m=6 to l=15 years), Schoolyear and Age are the respondent producer’s schooling years and age 
respectively,  Organicyears  are  the  number  of  years  of  organic  certification.  The  other  two 
regressors (FTyear and FTyearlargefam) are the same as in (1). 
The  specification  presented  in  (3)  contains  lagged  values  of  the  dependent  variable  among 
regressors.  Arellano  and  Bover  (1995)  and  Blundell  and  Bond  (1998)  demonstrate  that  the 
correlation between the lagged dependent variable and the error term makes OLS estimates biased 
and inconsistent, even when error terms are not serially correlated. They develop a GMM approach 
to  tackle  this  issue.  Following  them,  in  the  GMM  way,  we  identify  a  set  of  endogenous  or 
predetermined, and a set of strictly exogenous, instruments. In the first case we chose the education 
of the producer and of the producer’s parents. In the second one we chose two and three period 
lagged values of affiliation years plus year dummies. 
GMM  estimates  (as  random  effects)  allow  to  identify  significance  of  controls  which  were 
previously incorporated into fixed effects. As it is obvious to believe, the strong significance of the 
lagged  dependent  variable  confirms  that  the  household  schooling  investment  index  is  strongly 
autocorrelated.  Beyond  persistence,  the  dependent  variable  is  positively  affected  by  parental 
(father)  education,  consistently  with  standard  results  in  the  literature  (Edmonds,  2007),  while 
household respondent age is not significant (Table 6). The effect of preaffiliation (negative) and 
affiliation (positive) years in our GMM estimate at household level is consistent with what found in 
fixed family effect estimates at individual child level (Tables 4 and 5). The test on the residual 
autocorrelation  structure  does  not  reject  the  hypothesis  of  second  (while  not  first)  order 
autocorrelation. The Hansen test on overidentifying restrictions is robust and not unreasonably high. 
This reflect the parsimonious use of instruments we made in the estimates by using only second and 
third lag for GMM instruments.    22 
Note that the null of exogeneity of our instrumented variables  is not rejected by the Davidson-
McKinnon test but only if we consider the 1 percent significant threshold. As  a robustness check, 
following  what  found  in  the  child  unit  estimates  presented  in  Tables  4  and  5,  we  modify  the 
specification by adding the baseline affiliation year effect among regressors (Table 6, column 2). 
The exogeneity test is not passed in this case. 
When we restrict the sample to treatment producers only our main result holds (Table 6, column 3) 
and the exogeneity is closer to the rejection of the null (and definitely so in the specification in 





Poverty can be usefully conceived as a set of exclusions (from credit, product markets, insurance, 
education) which prevent individuals from fully exploiting their talents, limiting their productive 
contribution to the society. In this paper we demonstrate how exclusions can interact with each 
other generating virtuous or vicious circles. More specifically, by performing an impact study on 
the effects of affiliation to fair trade for a cooperative of organic farmers, we document that the 
improvement  of  access  to  foreign  markets  (with  a  package  of  initiatives  promoted  by  FT)  has 
positive  and  significant  effects  on  access  to  education  of  children  when  producers  have  large 
families. 
Our findings document that years of affiliation significantly ease the well known quantity/quality 
trade  off  (which  also  implies  a  lower  probability  of  school  enrolment  for  children  in  larger 
families).  From  a  methodological  point  of  view  we  obtain  these  results  by  developing  a 
retrospective panel data approach based on memorable events and control for selection bias and 
endogeneity with various techniques (analysis of preformation trends, restriction of the estimate to 
the treatment sample only, adoption of GMM estimates to cope with endogeneity).   23 
Our findings are consistent with FT criteria and prediction from the luxury axiom. A plausible 
interpretation consistent with observed FT criteria and characteristics is that FT affiliation raises 
producers revenue by easing access to foreign markets and financing technical innovation. This 
enables producer families to overcome those income thresholds which induce them to send more 
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Table 1 Price formation in Bak Reua and Kud Chun cooperatives 
 
  Bak Reua  Kud Chun 
October 2007 - organic farmers 
discussed about the price of the 
paddy and set it around: 
THB 10,000 
January 2008 – Conventional 
farmers received from the market 
the same price as organic farmers 
(THB 10000). 
Organic farmers hence asked 
GreenNet to receive a higher price 
as incentive for remaining 
affiliated. 
Finally GreenNet increased the 
price for organic paddy of: 
+ THB 2,500 
Hence, for organic farmers the 
guaranteed price for 2008 is on 
average: 
= THB 12,500 
[Paddy price can still vary according to quality]. 
Additionally, the FT premium that 
goes only to producer’s group is for 
2008 (according to FLO law): 
+ THB 750 
The FT bonus (also called paddy 
fund) that goes directly to organic 
farmers is: 
+ THB 1,280 
Further FT benefits: 
Local training, extension activities, advising and support to organic 
farmers 
Local cooperative  dividend (to 
organic and conventional 
members). 
Variable (positive) computed as 
follows: 
8% of the capital share farmers 
invested in the cooperative  
+ THB 50 per ton of paddy sold. 
Variable 
(0 in the last years) 
Fair-trade premium utilization 
 
The premium is divided into 
several funds to which farmer 
members can apply for support 
(a) green manure seed 
(b) farmer training 
(c) member welfare, e.g. 
education of their children, 
natural disaster relief 
(a) 50% is allocated to the mill to 
improve its management  
(b) 25% is allocated to the 
extension works 
(c) 25% is allocated for Organic 
Fair-Trade Fund. This Fund has 
also contribution from other 
sources and provides loans to 
members who wish to convert to 
sustainable production as well as 
other community benefits. 
Local cooperative funds (to 
organic and conventional 
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Table 2. Summary information on the samples 
   THE “TREATMENT” GROUP AND  THE “CONTROL GROUP  
 IN THE WHOLE AREA 
Number of Observations  360 
N. of fair trade affiliated organic farmers (treatment group)  180 
N. of non fair trade affiliated  non-organic farmers (control group)  180 
Total n. of farmers affiliated to cooperatives  288 
N. of control group farmers non affiliated to cooperatives  72 
N. of control group farmers affiliated to cooperatives  108 
N. of Farmers in conversion  14 
BAK REUA 
Number of Observations  210 
N. of fair trade affiliated organic farmers (treatment group)  105 
N. of non fair trade affiliated  non-organic farmers (control group)  105 
Total n. of farmers affiliated to cooperatives  162 
N. of control group farmers non affiliated to cooperatives  48 
N. of control group farmers affiliated to cooperatives  57 
N. of Farmers in conversion  7 
KUD CHUM 
Number of Observations  150 
N. of fair trade affiliated organic farmers (treatment group)  75 
N. of non fair trade affiliated  non-organic farmers (control group)  75 
Total n. of farmers affiliated to cooperatives  126 
N. of control group farmers non affiliated to cooperatives  24 
N. of control group farmers affiliated to cooperatives  51 
N. of Farmers in conversion  7 
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Table 3. Confidence intervals of selected variables for FT producers and the control sample 
  Ft producers  Non Ft producers 
Variables   Obs.   Mean   [95%  Conf. Interv.]  Obs.   Mean   [95%  Conf. Interv.] 
Socio-demographic features             
Ft years  180  5.283*      5.078092   5.488574  180            0   
Certification years  180  6.888*      6.431667     7.34611  180            0   
Age  180  49.1  47.41761    50.78239  180  51.32222  49.51545      53.129 
School years  180      6.611*      6.132579    7.089643  180  5.905556*      5.49255    6.318561 
People in the household  180      3.827      3.613573    4.041983  180         3.766667  3.516413     4.01692 
Number of children  180  2.488      2.302008    2.675769  180  2.55      2.331082    2.768918 
             
Income, productivity and investment           
Income from agriculture   180  60942.49*  55225.46  66659.53  179  41646.37*  36363.51   46929.22 
Total income   180  78778.61*  70469.44    87087.77  179      55173.74*  48040.08    62307.41 
Family income   180  104897.3
  92479.45    117315.2  179         87089.39  72814.02    101364.8 
Temporary employees   180      3.822*    2.914331    4.730113  180             2.55*  1.87567     3.22433 
Employee daily wage   86        156.279  147.1056    165.4525  69        153.7681  148.6373     158.899 
Land size   180    26.080  24.17416    27.98695  180  23.85556  21.61981     26.0913 
Total productivity  180  93.749*  77.02672    110.4715  177  67.43628*  54.95465    79.91791 
Productivity of the 1
st working activity   180  125.891      104.4428    147.3399  177         98.40271  72.09847    124.7069 
Productivity of the 2
nd working activity  92  49.014*  32.77152    65.25622  85  25.87522*  19.59875    32.15169 
Investment in input  180         14651.67  2960.193    26343.14  180         5265.556  258.4469    10272.66 
Price, sales and trading conditions             
Local (non GreenNet) cooperative  price  177  11305.73*  11141.69    11469.76  81        10019.32*  9824.894    10213.75 
FT price  177         13940.98  13832.28    14049.68       
Other buyers price  4          11583.25  4267.535    18898.96  116         10420.78  9916.863    10924.69 
Cooperatives advance payments  176      .0454545     .0143782    .0765309  176  0   
GreenNet dividends  177  306.0904 *    219.1588     393.022  77  101.2597*  56.44248     146.077 
Other cooperative dividends   6  14  -7.197561    35.19756  115  40.6087  7.949534    73.26786 
Food expenditure and self-consumption          
Household weekly food expenditure  180         430.7111  381.1277    480.2945  180       461.5556  419.4204    503.6907 
Rice self-consumption share  180  100  100         100  180  100  100         100 
Noodles self-consumption share  170  .2941176  -.2865001    .8747354  167  1.197605  -.4693058    2.864515 
Vegetables self-consumption share  180  81.33333*  77.6292    85.03747  180  71.30556*  66.74405    75.86706 
Papaya self-consumption share  180  79.35*  74.34501    84.35499  179  67.7933*  61.65727    73.92932 
Fresh fruit self-consumption share  180  53.96111*  48.87574    59.04649  180  39.55556*  34.51099    44.60012 
Eggs self-consumption share  180  25.98889*  19.91602    32.06176  179         16.98324*  11.77462    22.19186 
Milk self-consumption share  170  3.582353  .7799004    6.384805  170  2.411765  .1084575    4.715072 
Chicken self-consumption share  178  52.86517  45.86483    59.86551  179  49.27374  42.44436    56.10313 
Other meat self-consumption share  177  0    177  .0564972  -.0550019    .1679963 
Fish self-consumption share  180  70.38889*  65.07485    75.70292  179  57.15084*  51.09267      63.209 
Fresh noodles self-consumption share  172      .5813953      -.5662407    1.729031  175  .5714286  -.5563951    1.699252 
Market value of self consumption   180  29502.66*  27029.26    31976.06  180  24216.51*  21754.81    26678.21 
Savings, debt and wealth             
Debt/income   180  1.040396  .7944135    1.286379  179  1.24762  .9143597     1.58088 
Saving/income (percent)  180  15.56389*  12.96199    18.16578  180  11.46944*      9.378305    13.56058 
Number of durables owned  180      8.333333 *     8.144836    8.521831  180              7.5*  7.258395    7.741605 
5 percent significance of the difference in means between affiliated and non affiliated farmers.   
Source Becchetti, Conzo and Gianfreda (2008)   30 
 
Figure 1a Schooling probability and birth order.  
Legend. Vertical axis: probability of going to school, horizontal axis birth order in the family. 


















Figure 1b Schooling probability and number of children in the family.  
Legend. Vertical axis: probability of going to school, horizontal axis number of children in the 
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All sample  
   Treatment sample only 
      
Families with more  




children  only 
             
Sons  -1.024  -1.025  -0.774   -1.481   -1.488  -1.120  
  (-1.56)  (-1.56)  (-1.24)  (-1.88)  (-1.88)  (-1.40) 
Trendsaraflo  -0.001  -0.002  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001   -0.001  
  (-2.22)  (-1.74)  (-1.28)  (-3.10)  (-2.83)  (-1.73) 
Ftagehighc  0.702  0.695  0.604   0.715   0.676  0.764 
  (4.51)  (4.31)  (1.93)  (4.53)  (4.22)  (1.67) 
FT Age    0.0283      0.247   
    (0.17)      (1.11)   
 Year dummies  Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes 
             
N. of Obs.  3464  3464  1861  2156  2156  1038 
Nr. of Groups  181  181  82  115  115  47 
LR χ
2 (22)  495.60  495.63  87.84  347.67  348.97  48.62 
Log Likelihood  -1131.699  -1131.685  -740.322   -684.689   -684.043  -415.995 
Prob > χ
2  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.001 
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where Schoolijt is a dummy taking value of one if the i-th children of the j-th family went to school in the year t and zero 
otherwise, Nchildjt is the number of children in the family j at time t, TrendfutureFT is a (pre-formation) trend variable 
measuring the number of years in the sample of the child family before entering into FT, FTYearlargefam, is the 
number of FT affiliation years for farmilies with more than two children, FTyear is the number of affiliation years, 
DYear are time dummies (1989 is the omitted benchmark year) and ηj  are fixed family effects.   32 
Table 5. The effect of Fair Trade affiliation on schooling decisions: random effect probit 
regression (marginal effects) 
                   
  
  
All sample  
   Treatment sample only 
     
Families with more  







Sons  -0.138  -0.136  -0.208  -0.272  -0.2689  -0.334 
  (-2.23)  (-2.19)  (-2.21)  (-3.38)  (-3.32)  (-3.47) 
Area  -0.881  -0.883  -0.191  -1.239  -1.244  -0.531 
  (-5.58)  (-5.60)  (-0.82)  (-6.35)  (-6.40)  (-1.77) 
Controlcoop  0.0361  0.208  0.190       
  (0.17)  (0.64)  (0.34)       
Agriculture  -0.016  -0.0158  0.003  -0.0236  -0.024  -0.006 
  (-1.78)  (-1.79)  (0.29)  (-2.26)  (-2.27)  (-0.40) 
Birthyear  0.1038511  0.104  0.003  0.094  0.094  0.102 
  (8.62)  (8.63)  (5.87)  (6.55)  (6.59)  (5.45) 
Trendsaraflo  -0.0001  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001 
  (-1.12)  (-1.25)  (-0.67)  (-2.00)  (-2.34)  (-1.38) 
Ftage    0.050      0.141   
    (0.71)      (1.51)   
Ftagehighc  0.309  0.303  0.254  0.324  0.313  0.318 
  (4.42)  (4.29)  (1.83)  (4.57)  (4.39)  (1.65) 
Year dummies   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Cons  -199.660  -200.397  -194.408  -179.341  -180.752  -196.656 
   (-8.39)  (-8.40)  (-5.75)  (-6.33)  (-6.39)  (-5.34) 
             
Hausman test* (p-value)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.56)  (0.02)  (0.05)  (0.99) 
             
N  5652  5652  2820  3870  3870  1798 
Nr. of Groups  325  325  137  228  228  89 
LR χ
2 (26)  461.18  459.89  110.03  367.20  368.92  99.51 
Log Likelihood  -1760.423  -1760.169  -1045.842  -1088.801  -1087.628  -595.019 
Prob > χ
2  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
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where Schoolijt is a dummy taking value of one if the i-th children of the j-th family went to school in the year t and zero 
otherwise, Nchildjt is the number of children in the family j at time t, Area is a dummy taking value of one if the 
producer is located in Kud Chun and zero otherwise, Controlcoop is a dummy for control producers which takes value 
of one if they belong to a cooperative, Birthyear is the producer’s year of birth), TrendfutureFT is a (pre-formation) 
trend  variable  measuring  the  number  of  years  in  the  sample  of  the  child  family  before  entering  into  FT, 
FTYearlargefam, is the number of FT affiliation years for farmilies with more than two children, FTyear is the number 
of affiliation years, DYear are time dummies (1989 is the omitted benchmark year) and  jt u  are random effects.  
Hausman  test.  H0:  the  coefficients  of  the  random  (this  Table)  and  the  fixed  effect  estimate  (Table  4)  are  not 
significantly different from each other.   33 
Table 6. Robustness check: GMM estimates on the effects of FT affiliation on the Household 
Schooling Index (HSI)  
  ALL SAMPLE   TREATMENT GROUP ONLY 
HSIt-1  0.840  0.829  0.854  0.841 
  (12.74)  (11.73)  (11.48)  (10.95) 
Schoolyear  0.046  0.044  0.016  0.017 
  (2.75)  (2.58)  (1.07)  (1.08) 
Age  -0.005  -0.005  -0.003  -0.003 
  (-1.38)  (-1.45)  (-0.81)  (-0.89) 
Organicyears  -0.016  -0.019  -0.011  -0.016 
  (-2.33)  (-2.37)  (-1.78)  (-2.52) 
Ftage    0.019    0.137 
    (0.35)    (1.12) 
Ftagehighc  0.038  0.033  0.041  0.034 
  (2.55)  (1.62)  (4.06)  (2.93) 
Cons  0.126  -0.310  0.172  0.191 
  (0.60)  (-1.12)  (0.94)  (1.03) 
Number of obs.  2567  2567  1566  1566 
Number of groups 
266  266  165  165 
AR(1) test 
-7.79  -7.75  -6.45  -6.37 
Prob> χ
2 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
AR(2) test 
-0.73  -0.75  0.68  0.66 
Prob> χ
2 
(0.466)  (0.455)  (0.498)  (0.510) 
Sargan test 
89.24  89.91  108.67  107.34 
Prob> χ
2 
(0.082)  (0.064)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
Hansen test 
55.21  53.38  56.21  56.79 
Prob>chi2 
(0.929)  (0.941)  (0.884)  (0.853) 
Davidson-McKinnon exogeneity test 
3.334  7.825  2.963  0.807 
P-value 
0.019  0.001  0.031  0.490 
 
The base specification is:  
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where 
t i l k HSI , ) , ( t t  is the schooling investment index for the  ) , ( l k t t  school age cohort, Age and Schoolyear are the 
respondent  producer’s  age  and  schooling  years  respectively,  Organicyears  are  the  number  of  years  of  organic 
certification, Dtime are year dummies, FTyearlargefam, is the number of FT affiliation years for farmilies with more 
than two children and FTyear is the number of affiliation years. The equation is estimated with a system GMM model 
with two-step coefficients and Windmejier (2005) correction to obtain unbiased standard errors. Variables used for 
building  endogenous  or  predetermined  (GMM)  instruments  are  producer’s  and  producer’s  mother  and  father 
schoolyears. Variables used for building strictly exogenous instruments are two and three period lagged affiliation 
years.  Time  dummy  coefficients  are  omitted  and  available  upon  request.  The  Sargan  and  Hansen  statistics  are 
distributed as a χ
2 under the null of instrument validity. AR(1) and AR(2) are  tests for first and second order serial 
correlation in the residuals, asymptotically distributed as a N(0,1) under the null of instrument validity. The Davidson-
McKinnon statistic is distributed as an F under the null of orthogonality of the set of strictly exogenous instruments to 
the error term of the base estimate. * We estimate the model in the subsample of the control group and the treatment 
group before affiliation. We introduce a variable in which a linear trend is multiplied for the treatment group dummy 
and test whether the latter it is significantly different from zero. The table reports the coefficient and the t-statistics.   34 
Appendix 1 Variable legend  
 
Variables  Description  Variables  Description 
 Area 1   Variable taking value of 1 if respondents 
live in Kud Chun  
Employee daily wage  Temporary employees’ daily wage 
Area 2  Variable taking value of 1 if respondents 
live in Bak Reua 
 Investment in input  Investment in input during last year 
Affiliation dummy  Dummy taking the value of 1 if 
respondents are affiliated to FT and 0 
otherwise 
 Male  Dummy taking the value of 1 if 
respondents are male 
 Age  Respondents’ Age   Married  Dummy taking the value of 1 if 
respondents are married 
Control group   Dummy taking the value of 1 if 
respondents are members of cooperatives 
buy are not FT affiliated 
 Divorced  Dummy taking the value of 1 if 
respondents are divorced 
 School years  Years of school attendance   Unmarried  Dummy taking the value of 1 if 
respondents are unmarried 
 Number of children  Number of children   Certification years  Number of organic certification years 
 People in the household   Number of people living in the 
household 
Certification years 1  Certification years in area 1 (Kud Chun) 
 Family food consumption  Household’s food expenditure in a week  Certification years 2  Certification years in area 1 (Bak Reua) 
 Rice  % of rice self-produced  FT years  Number of FT affiliation years 
 Noodles  % of noodles self-produced  FT years 1  FT years in area 1 (Kud Chun) 
 Vegetables  % of vegetables self-produced  FT years 2  FT years in area 1 (Bak Reua) 
 Papaya  % of papaya self-produced   Durables owned  Sum of durables owned by respondents 
 Fresh fruit  % of fresh fruit self-produced  Cooperatives price  Price of Jasmine rice paid by local 
cooperatives 
 Egg   % of eggs self-produced  FT price  Fair trade price for Jasmine price 
Milk  % of milk self-produced  Ft premium  Difference betweem FT price and the 
price payed by local cooperatives 
 Chicken  % of chicken self-produced  Other buyers price  Price of Jasmine rice paid by other 
buyers 
 Other meat  % of other meat self-produced  Cooperatives advance payments  Advance payment from local 
cooperatives (Jasmine rice) 
 Fish  % of fish self-produced  Cooperatives profit/dividends  Profit/dividend received from local 
cooperatives (Jasmine rice) 
 Fresh noodles  % of fresh noodles self-produced  Other buyers profit/dividends  Profit/dividend received from other 
buyers (Jasmine rice) 
Value of self consumption (per year)  Value of self-production (per year)  Total  productivity  Total income per hour worked 
 Years in agriculture  Working years in agriculture  Productivity 1
st activity  Respondents’ income  from agriculture 
per hour worked 
Income from agriculture  Respondents’ yearly income in 
agriculture 
Productivity 2
nd activity  Respondents’ income from second 
activity per hour worked 
Total income  Respondents’ yearly income from the 
main and the second activity 
Debt/income   Family debt to income ratio 
Family income  The sum of the yearly income earned by 
all members of the household 
Saving/income  Last year saving as a percentage of 
income 
Temporary employees   Number of the respondents’ temporary 
employees  
Land size  Total land size (rai) 
Positive exogenous events  Exogenous events having a positive 
impact on respondents’ income  
i) increase in the paddy rice market price, 
ii) a positive shock on production, iii) 
present from farmers’ sons and daughters 
(money or, in same cases, a car), v) wage 
shock in the second activity, vi) lottery 
winning and vii) granting of awards.) 
Negative exogenous events  Exogenous events having a negative  
impact on respondents’ income 
(i) close relatives’s death, ii) desease, iii) 
car accidents, iv) fire, v) car breaking, an 
vi) increase in the input market price, vii) 
the death of animals used as capital 
investment (such as water buffalos), viii) 
a slow development of the soil.) 
 
Distance from cooperatives  Distance from cooperatives     
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Appendix 2 Questionnaire 
N°  Question  Alternatives                 
1  Case number  CG or TG                  
2  Sex  female [1]                 
    male [3]                 
3  Age  number                 
4  Civil status  Unmarried [1]                 
    divorced [3]                 
    married [5]                 
5 
Are you member of a 
cooperative/producers' 
group? 
yes [1]                  
    no [0]                  
6 
If 5 = yes: How far do you 
live from the cooperative 
center (in Yasothon)? 
km                 
7 
How many people in your 
household migrated in the 
last five years? 
number                 
8  If 7 = yes: What for?  Relatives moved as 
well [1]                 
    Schooling [3]                 
    Marriage [5]                 
    Look for work/start 
new job [7]                 
    Famine, draught, 
disease [9]                 




               
9  if 7 = yes: Where?  Other village [1]                 
    Bangkok [3]                 
    Other-Non-Bangkok 
[5]                 
    Other-non-Thailand 
[7]                 
10 
How much do you 
consider yourself happy 
(from 0 to 10)? 
0-10                 
11  How many years have you 
attended the school?  years                 
12  How many children do you 
have? [fill the tab below]  number                 
13  Children tab  Sex  Activity  



































  First                            
  Second                            
  Third                             
  Fourth                            
  Fifth                            
  Sixth                            
  Seventh                            
  Eighth                            
14  How far do you live from 
the school?  km                  
15 
During the last year your 
children went to school 
how much have you spent 
on education for?  
baht                 
  Fees                   
  Uniforms                   
  Textbooks                     36 
  Exercise books, pens, 
pencils                   
  Meals, transportation                   
  Other expenses                   
16  Where was your last child 
born?  at home [1]                 
    in a rural clinic [3]                 
    in the hospital [5]                 
    other (specify) [7]                 
17  Has your last child been 
vacccinated?  yes [1]                  
    no [0]                  
18 
How much did you spend 
this year for dental care for 
the whole family? 
baht                 
19  Has one of your children 
died? 
number of children 
died                 
20 
Have you seriously injured 
yourself during the last 
year? 
how many times                 
21 
How many days have you 
got sick and could not go 
to work? 
days                 
22 
If you were to sell your 
plot of land today, how 
much could you sell it for? 
baht/RAI                 
23  Do you use any chemical 
fertilizer/pesticide?  yes [1]                  
    no [0]                  
24 
If 23 = no: Did you use 
chemical ferilizer/pesticide 
in the past? 
yes [1]                  
    no [0]                  
25  if 24= yes: When did you 
stop using them?  year                 
26  How many people do 
usually live in your house? number                 
27 
During the past year, how 
many times have you 
attended extension training 
activities? 
times [0 if not 
attended]                 
28  If 27>0: What kind of 
training courses?   Use of fertilizers [1]                 
    Irrigation [3]                 
    New seeds [5]                 
    Pest infestation [7]                 
    Blight problems [9]                 
    soil problems [11]                 
    weather problems [13]                
    general crop advice 
[15]                 
    marketing advice [17]                
    insemination services 
[19]                 
    other (specify) 
_______ [21]                 
29  If 27=0: Why?  I am not interested [1]                
    I don't have time [3]                 
    I can't afford them [5]                
    there aren't training 
courses [7]                 
30 
Which is the main building 
material used for your 
house? 
timbers [1]                 
    bricks and concrete 
[3]                 
    other [5]                 
31  Which kind of floor is 
there in the house?  bare ground [1]                   37 
    cement [3]                 
    wood boards [5]                 
    tiles [7]                 
    other [9]                 
32  Which is the main light 
source you have at home?  electricity [1]                 
    gas [3]                 
    oil lamp [5]                 
    candle [7]                 
    other (specify) [9]                 
33 
What type of fuel does 
your family mainly use for 
cooking? 
wood [1]                 
    coal [3]                 
    gas [5]                 
    electricity [7]                 
    dung [9]                 




               
34  Has your family  access to 
drinkable water?  yes [1]                  
    no [0]                  
35  Bathroom location and 
sharing: 
inside and exclusive 
[9]                 
    inside and shared [7]                 
    outside and exclusive 
[5]                 
    outside and shared [3]                
    no bathroom [1]                 
36 
How much do usually you 
spend in food for all your 
family in a week? 
bath                 








     





month [7]  never [9]  0 - 100 %       
  Rice             
  Noodles             
  Vegetables             
  Green Papaya             
  Fresh fruit             
  Eggs             
  Milk             
  Chicken             
  Other meat             
  Fish             
  Fresh noodles             
38 
How do you consider your 
standard of living 
compared to the one of 
other people who live in 
this village? 
much better [1]                 
    better [3]                 
    equal [5]                 
    lower [7]                 
    much lower [9]                 
39  Besides agriculture do you 
have another activity?  craftwork [1]                 
    construction [3]                 
    other (speficy)_____ 
[5]                 





worked/day            38 
ear 
  Agricolture                       
  Second                       
41  How many employees do 
you have?  Number of employees Daily wage               
  stable employees                      
  temporary employees                     
42 
Are you usually involved 
in a labour exchange 
system? 
yes [1]                  
    no [0]                  
43 
Buyers Tab - Who do you 
usually sell Jasmine Rice 
to? 
Which share of 
production do you 
usually sell to each 


















How much are you satisfied with the 
price?   
     %  baht/ton  Yes [1] 
No [0]  baht  [1= very much 2= enough; 3= not very 
satisfied; 4= not at all]   
  Local cooperative                  
  Other buyers                  
44 
During last five years have 
you changed your 
production system? 
yes [1]                  
    no [0]                  
45  Please tell me the yearly 
income in your family.  baht                 
  husband/wife                   
  sons/daughters                   
  other members                   
46 
Do you have other sources 
of non work income 
(subsidies, donations, etc.) 
? 
yes [1]                  
  from the community  no [0]                  
  from the state                   
  from private persons                   
  from development 
agencies/ngos                   
  remittances from relatives                   
  rents                   
  other (specify)_____                   
47 
Which of the following 
things does your family 
own? 
yes [1]  no [0]                  
  tv                   
  entertainment devices 
(CD, DVD players, etc.)                   
  fridge                   
  bicycle                   
  motorcycle                   
  car                   
  water pump                   
  plowing machine                   
  gas stove                   
  truck                   
  mobile phone                   
48 
How much are you 
satisfied with your 
household’s living 
conditions?  
[0 - 10]                 
49 
How much do you 
consider yourself  a good 
farmer?  
[0 - 10]                 
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